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Components of Consumer Drones
• Common figurations include: 
• CPU/RAM
• Wi-Fi/RF communications
• Camera
• Storage
• Sensors 
• Aeronautical hardware
• A controller for manual flight operations
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A drone is a flying computer …
Caveats
• This is preliminary research, much more to come
• Experimenting with a single, older (and no longer manufactured) 
drone borrowed from Aeronautical Sciences
• Results are not necessarily generalizable to other drones
• This is a replication and extension of previously published research
Parrot AR.Drone 2.0
Step 1: Identify Vulnerabilities


Telnet and FTP provide remote 
access to the drone …
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Login from Raspberry PI to AR.Drone
Access doesn’t require 
a user ID or a password!!
Login from Raspberry PI to AR.Drone
I’m now running as ‘root’ which is
the same as ‘Administrator’ under
Windows (“God”-like user)
Let’s snoop around to see 
what we can find …

Destructive commands

Destructive commands
Let’s perform some attacks …
Can we download/upload files 
from the drone?
(via File Transfer Protocol)





Denial-of-Service through 
De-authentication …
(like hanging up a phone call)
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Can we eavesdrop?
Let’s listen in on the video 
feed …
Capture the communications from the drone on the video channel.


Drone Controller Video channel

Video frames are wrapped by 
Parrot Video Encapsulation (PaVE),
proprietary encapsulation format
Still working on ‘unwrapping’ 
the video…
Let’s eavesdrop on ALL of the 
communications…
AT commands are 
instructions to control 
the drone

Finally, let’s turn the d*mn thing off







Conclusions
• Using it’s default settings, the AR.Drone 2.0 has several 
security vulnerabilities
• No authentication (username/password)
• Commands are run as root (“God”)
• Eavesdrop: No encryption of the data and controller links
• Denial-of-service through de-authentication or poweroff
• Issues with system integrity as many destructive Linux 
commands are available
• Files can be downloaded and uploaded to/from the drone
Future Research
• Implement other exploits on the AR.Drone
• GPS jamming and/or spoofing
• Jamming is illegal … FCC “no muy bueno” ...
• MITM
• Unwrap the PaVE video
• Vulnerability assessments on other drones
• Parrot
• DJI
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